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Visual Body Cavity Searches Incident to
Arrest: Validity Under the

Fourth Amendment
"But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done."
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INTRODUCTION

'Raise your left breast,' one of the matrons ordered. Joan did.
'Now raise your right breast.' Joan did as she was told. She was no
longer protesting. She wasn't saying a word. Then the matrons told
Joan to 'spread your lips,' . . . Joan opened her mouth. The matrons
were yelling now. 'Spread your lips!' Joan opened her mouth wider.
'Your pussy lips, lady, your pussy!'"
This is the visual body cavity search. Many people would be
offended, disgusted or embarrassed just by reading the excerpt. As a
polite society we do not discuss such things. The courts have historically brandished colorful expressions of shock and dismay over questionable uses of such searches. Despite their apparent revulsion, the
courts fear second guessing the decisions of police and prison security
experts.
In the last twenty years, some state legislatures have provided protection where the courts were unwilling. Some police departments,
1. ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT To PRIVACY 5 (Vintage Books
1997) (1995) (interviewing a plaintiff from Mary Beth G. v. Chicago).
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whether concerned with the just application of their authority or with
avoiding lawsuits, have independently set procedural safeguards with
regards to body cavity searches. If states have begun to address the
issue, and police departments are slowly becoming more cautious, then
why is it important to discuss the reasonableness of visual body cavity
searches under the Fourth Amendment?
First, too many states and police departments have not addressed
the issue or have done so incompletely. In Massachusetts, the Boston
Police Department settled a 1998 lawsuit filed by a woman because the
department had no written policy defining strip search procedures. 2 In
Illinois, the Cook County sheriff was found to have violated the constitutional rights of women by establishing a policy of strip searching
female suspects when they returned from court, even when the women
were cleared of charges and returned for processing. No such policy
existed for male suspects.'
Second, some courts have found that where a state statute does not
specifically address suppression of evidence as the remedy for violations
of strip and body cavity search regulations, the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine and its prophylactic protection do not apply.4 Thus, State
statutory protection can be incomplete or simply insufficient.
Third, a meaningful understanding of case law in this area will continue to be difficult to decipher until a common lexicon is used to categorize and discuss the searches themselves.'
Therefore, a review of the treatment of visual body cavity searches
and a determination of the scope of our federal constitutional protection
under the Fourth amendment is still vital.
This article specifically will address issues relating to visual body
cavity searches conducted incident to an arrest. Part II will discuss the
often overlapping and conflicting terminology used by the courts and in
statutes to describe and categorize the body cavity search. Part III will
compare and contrast the tests found in Bell v. Wolfish6 and in Schmer-

ber v. California7 for determining the constitutionality of visual body
cavity searches. It will also show that the two tests can operate in harmony to provide greater Fourth Amendment protection from visual body
cavity searches incident to arrest. Part IV will discuss the danger to

2. See Cindy Rodriguez, Police Pay $48,000 to Settle Strip Search Case, Boston Globe, Oct.
2, 1998, at B3.
3. See Strip Searches Wrong, Judge Tells Sheahan, Chicago Sun Times, August 22, 1998, at
6.
4. See State v. Wade, 208 Cal. App. 3d 304, 308 (1989).
5. See infra Part Il.A.
6. See infra Part II.B.

7. See infra Part HILA.
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Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable strip or body cavity
searches posed by the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary
rule and by judicial deference to prison policymakers.
U].

THE LANGUAGE GAP

"Body cavity search" is an umbrella term for a range of searches
intrusive to one's person. Unfortunately, the terms used to describe and
categorize the searches, such as strip search, visual body cavity search,
and physical body cavity search, are often used interchangeably in court
opinions and in state legislation. This inconsistency in language results
in a confused body of law.
Clarification is necessary because, as this article will explain, a person's reasonable expectation of privacy regarding a particular body
search can depend upon the category a court or state places the search,
as well as the investigative status of the person being searched.
A.

Defining the Categories

This article considers body cavity searches as having three distinct
categories: strip searches, visual body cavity searches, and manual body
cavity searches. For the purpose of this article, the strip search includes
only those searches that do not involve a visual or manual inspection of
the genitals or anus. Some courts and state statutes agree with this definition, but others consider the visual inspection of genital and anal
regions as merely part of viewing the naked body in a basic strip
search. 8
Visual body cavity searches, for the purpose of this article, include
only searches where there is a visual inspection of a person's genitals or
anus, but no physical contact or intrusion. As mentioned above, visual
body cavity searches have been classified by some as being within the
definition of a strip search. Other jurisdictions consider the visual body
cavity search as being an independent category level between the basic
strip search and the manual body cavity search.9 Still others consider a
8. See Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F. 2d 393, 394 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that visual
inspection of the pubic area of one arrestee and requiring another to bend over and grab her ankles

was not considered a visual body cavity search); KAN. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 22-2520(a),(b)
(West 1997) (defining "strip search" as "removing or rearranging some or all of a person's
clothing, by or at the direction of a law enforcement officer, so as to permit a visual inspection of
the genitals, buttocks, anus or female breasts of such person"; and "body cavity" search as "the
touching or probing of a person's vaginal or rectal cavity by or at the direction of a law
enforcement officer").
9. "A 'strip search' . . . generally refers to an inspection of a naked individual, without
scrutiny of any of the subject's body cavities. A 'visual body cavity search' extends to visual
inspection of the anal and genital areas. A 'manual body cavity search' includes some degree of
touching or probing of body cavities." Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 561 n.3 (lst Cir. 1985)
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visual search of the genitals or anus to be within the same class as
searches, where a physical intrusion into an orifice takes place, and call
both "body cavity searches."'" No matter what category visual body cavity searches are placed in, even absent physical contact, they are considered "demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying,

unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, [and] signifying degradation and
submission ...""
For the purpose of this article, manual body cavity searches, also
known as physical body cavity searches, include not only those performed by insertion of, or manipulation with, the fingers, but also endoscopic examinations

2

and the use of gynecological devices.3

Such

searches are considered among the most distasteful intrusions of the
body, 4 outside of intrusions where the human body or its 5functions are
controlled by someone other than the person themselves.'
The need for a common language with which to discuss these
searches is crucial in order to communicate with one another in an effective way. Both the legislature and the courts will fail in their duty to
(citing Security & Law Enforcement Employees v. Carey, 737 F. 2d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 1984)). See
also CAL. PENAL CODE § 4030(d) (West 1999) ("strip search" as the removal or rearrangement of
clothes to permit visual inspection of breasts, buttocks or genitalia; "visual body cavity search" as
the visual inspection of a body cavity; and "physical body cavity search" as the physical intrusion
into a body cavity); Timberlake v. Benton, 786 F. Supp. 676 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (holding that as
long as there is no entry into a body cavity, touching a person to more clearly peer into the cavity
does not shift the act into the manual body cavity search category).
10. See State v. Kelly, No. S-92-34, 1993 WL 241727, at *3 n.l (Ohio App. June 30, 1993)
("'Body cavity search' means an inspection of the anal or vaginal cavity of a person that is
conducted visually, manually, by means of any instrument, apparatus, or object, or in any other
manner while the person is detained or arrested for the alleged commission of a misdemeanor or
traffic offense."); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-7-121(a) (1998) ("'body cavity search' means an
inspection, probing or examination of the inside of a person's anus, vagina or genitals ...
");N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A: 161A-3 (West 1998) ("'body cavity search'; means the visual inspection or
manual search of a person's anal or vaginal cavity").
11. State v. Clark, 654 P.2d 355, 359 n.8 (Haw. 1982) (quoting Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F.
Supp. 486, 491 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (citing an oral decision in Sala v. County of Suffolk (E.D. N.Y.
1978)).
12. See U.S. v. Nelson, 36 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 1994).
13. See State v. Clark, 654 P.2d at 358.
14. See Evans v. Maryland, 688 A.2d 28, 40 (Md. 1997).
15. Arguments that bodily integrity is unreasonably violated have generally been found only
where the human body or its functions are controlled by someone other than the person
themselves. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (physician assisted suicide);
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive's Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (mandatory urinalysis test to
search for drugs); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (surgery to remove evidentiary bullet from
a suspect); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood test to determine alcohol
content); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977)
(right to refuse medical care). But see Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that freedom from strip searches and degrading body searches is basic to the concept of
privacy; therefore, a state's right to interfere with bodily integrity by means of strip searches is
constitutionally limited).
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advise both the citizenry and the law enforcement bodies of the limitations of body cavity searches until it is clear to all what is meant by
physical, visual, and body cavity search.
B.

Investigative Statuses Which Affect Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy

A person's reasonable expectation of privacy and the levels of suspicion necessary to justify a visual body cavity search not only depend
on the nature of the search itself, but also on which stage of the police
investigative process the search occurs. This article describes four status
categories for the purpose of delineation: pre-arrest, incident to arrest,
pre-trial detention, and convicted prisoner.
A person in pre-arrest status is one engaged in any interaction with
police prior to an arrest. This includes voluntary interactions, stops, and
Terry searches. At this point a person has the highest expectation of
privacy in his body, and a warrantless strip search or visual body cavity
search is not permitted.
A more thorough search incident to arrest is permitted without a
warrant, but it must occur within a limited scope and time frame. The
United States Supreme Court, in Chimel v. California,16 described the
circumstances under which searches incident to arrest could take place
and for what purpose:
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be
used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to
prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime-things which might
easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under his immediate control. But these justifications are
absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest.17
When a suspect is detained at a detention facility after an arrest, he
is a pre-trial detainee. With regards to search acts which may be carried
out during that detention, the pre-trial detainee has a reasonable expectation of privacy equal to or less than that which he had incident to the
arrest. 8 In Fischer v. Washington MetropolitanArea TransitAuthority,
the court indicated that pre-trial detainees' "protectible rights of privacy
under the due process clause are necessarily more substantial in general
than are those of convicted inmates." 1 9
To varying degrees, depending on the specific jail configuration or
16.
17.
18.
19.

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id. at 764.
Fischer v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 1142 (4th Cir.1982).
See id.
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purpose, the pre-trial detainee's privacy rights are subordinated by the
state's interest in institutional security and court deference to the expertise of prison management.2 ° So much weight is given to prison security
interests, particularly with regard to illicit drugs, that upon mere reasonable suspicion, non-incarcerated prison visitors may be subjected to strip
searches, 2'and pre-trial detainees, whose charges have been dismissed,
can be forced to undergo visual body cavity searches when returning to
the detention center to complete release procedures. 22 Pre-trial detainees
have greater rights than convicts, but they may be treated as prisoners to
the extent that security, internal order, health, and discipline of the
prison demand.23
A convicted prisoner has the lowest expectation of privacy,
although incarceration is not a wall between the convict and the Constitution.24 Surprisingly, because of the frequent utilization of mixed-use
facilities, where both pre-trial detainees who are awaiting arraignment,
bail posting, or trial and incarcerated convicts are housed (though usually classified by a number of objective and subjective factors including
the alleged or proven crime), the limitation of Fourth Amendment constitutional protections for pre-trial detainees are often indistinguishable
from those already convicted because of prison security interests.
III.

TESTS OF PERMISSIBILITY UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The courts have analyzed intrusive body searches by examining a
person's expectation of privacy, the reasonableness of the search, and
the state's interest in conducting the search.
A.

The Schmerber Test

Some people may consider blood tests for alcohol, drugs, HIV, and
DNA as more intrusive than visual body cavity searches because the
former searches intrude beneath the skin and remove material from the
body. Conversely, some may view blood tests as common, causing little
trauma, pain, or risk, and involving little humiliation or loss of dignity.
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. See State v. Martinez, 580 P.2d 1282 (Haw. 1978).

22. See Gary v. Sheahan, No. 96-C-7294, 1998 WL 547116, at*l-2 (N.D. Ill. 1998). All
female detainees, including those whose charges were dismissed, were subjected to a strip search
before returning to their Division. First, they were required to remove all of their clothing.
Second, after removing all their clothing, the women were required to open their mouths and to
run their hands through their hair. Third, while naked, the women were required to squat or bend

over several times and cough.
23. See Bell v. Manson, 427 F.Supp. 450 (D.Conn. 1976).
24. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
25. See infra Part II.B.
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Therefore, others may feel blood tests are less intrusive than a visual or
manual body cavity search.
The United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California2 6 dis-

cussed for the first time searches that intrude beneath the body's surface
under a Fourth Amendment analysis. Previously, searches such as blood
tests and stomach pumping were tested under a Fourteenth Amendment
due process or Fifth Amendment self-incrimination analysis.27 The
Schmerber Court broke down the issues into: 1) whether police were
justified in requiring a blood test in this case incident to arrest and 2)
whether the means and procedures used to take blood test were reasonable.2s The search involved in Schmerber was a blood test to determine
whether Mr. Schmerber was driving while intoxicated at the time of his
accident. The blood was drawn by a physician in a hospital, despite Mr.
Schmerber's objections to the procedure.29 Unfortunately, the Court did
not take the opportunity to speak more on "intrusions beyond the body's
surface," specifically on what an intrusion entails.
The Court found this search to plainly fall within the constraints of
the Fourth Amendment. It then formulated a test to determine the constitutionality of such intrusions around the principle that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit all such searches, but only those that are
not justified by the circumstances or performed in an improper
30
manner.
In Schmerber, because the blood test was carried out as a search
incident to arrest, justification started with probable cause to arrest.
Usually, when it is established that probable cause for an arrest exists
and that an arrest was made, a search of the person incident to arrest for
weapons or readily destructible evidence is permitted. 31 However, the
Court here found this principle inapplicable where a search beyond the
body's surface is involved.32
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that
desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental
human interests require law enforcement officers to suffer the risk

that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate
26.
27.
(1957).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Id. at 768; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768.
See id. at 759.
Id. at 768.
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769.
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33

The Court also found it indisputably important that a neutral magistrate be the one to determine whether or not to invade another's body in
search of incriminating evidence.34 Warrantless searches are permitted
only when an emergency situation exists that threatens the destruction of
the evidence and when the chance of loss is increased by delay.3
Although the Court did not expressly require that there be probable
cause to conduct a search, it is inherent in issuing a search warrant that
probable cause be present. Next, the Court determined whether the
blood test itself was reasonable based upon the commonality of the test
on the one hand, and the possibility of risk, trauma or pain on the other.
Finally, the Court discussed whether the manner in which the test was
carried out was reasonable, taking into account who conducted the test
and where it took place. The Court warned that just because it found a
minor intrusion conducted under strictly controlled conditions to be reasonable, this did not mean that more substantial intrusions, under other
36
conditions, would not be considered unreasonable.
The most vexing issue for courts after Schmerber was the meaning
of "clear indication." Clear indication that evidence would be found in
the bloodstream existed in Schmerber according to Justice Brennan
because "the facts which established probable cause to arrest

. . .

sug-

gested the required relevance and likely success of a test."3 7 Several
jurisdictions subsequently attributed a variety of meanings to "clear indication" including: reasonable suspicion,38 probable cause, 39 as requiring
greater evidence than probable cause, 40 and as a third level of suspicion
greater than reasonable suspicion, but less than probable cause. 4 This
conundrum was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Hernandez.4"
In the opinion below, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used the
Supreme Court's language in Schmerber to hold that a "clear indication"
evidence would be found in plaintiffs body cavity was necessary in
order to detain her.43 The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of "clear indica33. Id. at 769-70 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 770.

35. See id.
36. Id. at 772.
37. Id. at 770.

38. See United States v. Mosquera-Ramirez, 729 F.2d 1352, 1355 (11 th Cir. 1984).
39. See State v. Pearson, 682 N.E.2d 1086 (Ohio App. 3d 1996).
40. See State v. Holmes, No. 1163 1986 WL 254, at *3 (Ohio App. 4th Dist. July 17, 1986).
41. See United States v. Mendez-Jiminez, 709 F.2d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that

"clear indication" means more than real suspicion but less than probable cause).
42. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
43. United States v. Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1984).
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tion" was as a standard greater than reasonable suspicion, but less than
probable cause." Although the issue in Hernandez was not the suspicion necessary to search, but to detain, the Supreme Court discussed the
Ninth Circuit' mis-interpretation of "clear indication". Justice Stevens
described "clear indication" not as a new level of suspicion, but merely a
"particularized suspicion" that evidence is located in a body cavity, not
merely on the person, and that the evidence is likely to be found." The
Hernandez Court went on to determine that only reasonable suspicion
was necessary to detain the plaintiff and not probable cause and clear
indication. The Court did not determine what level of suspicion is
required to perform a strip or body cavity search.46

The Schmerber Court's test for warrantless blood tests incident to
arrest under the Fourth Amendment, can be distilled as follows. First,
was there a lawful arrest?47 Second, was there probable cause to search
to search the person?48 Third, was there a clear indication that the
secreted evidence will be found in a body cavity, and not just anywhere
on the person? Fourth, was there an emergency circumstance that could
have destroyed the evidence?4 9 Fifth, what is the level of risk, trauma,
5" Sixth, was the search
and pain associated with this type of search?
51
manner?
itself carried out in a reasonable

B.

The Wolfish Test

At issue in Bell v. Wolfish52 was whether a blanket policy requiring
a visual body cavity search for all pre-trial detainees subsequent to visitations with persons from outside the prison was constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court refined the issue as "whether a
visual body cavity search as contemplated by the [correctional center's]
rules could ever be conducted on less than probable cause. 53
In Wolfish, the plaintiffs were housed in a federally maintained,
short-term housing facility designed primarily to house pre-trial detainees. 54 The facility also provided temporary housing for convicted
inmates awaiting sentencing or transportation to federal prison, and for
44. The Ninth Circuit referred to its decision in United States v. Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F.2d at
1355.
45. Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540-41.

46. See id. at n.4.
47. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769 (1966).
48. See supra Part II.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
id. at 771.
id.
U.S. 520 (1979).
Id. at 560.
See id. at 520.
See
See
See
441
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those inmates serving short term sentences in a service capacity for the
facility. 5 The pre-trial detainees were not touched during the visual cavity inspection, but they were required to open their body cavities for
viewing. 6 The District court had held that absent probable cause to
search, strip searches were reasonable, but visual body cavity searches
were not.5 ' The Court of Appeals had affirmed because it questioned the
utility of the searches and believed that the state's interest in conducting
the searches were outweighed by the "gross violation of personal privacy inherent in such a search ....

In deciding this case, Justice Rehnquist stated that "a balancing of
the need for a particular search against the invasion of personal rights" is
necessary in each case because "[t]he test of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application."59 To properly measure the balance, courts must consider:
1) the scope of the intrusion, 2) the manner in which the search is conducted, 3) the justification for initiating the search, and 4) the place in
which the search is conducted. 6°
The Wolfish Court determined that the facility's legitimate security
interests in preventing the smuggling of weapons, money, drugs, and
other contraband into a joint housing facility outweighed the intrusion of
a visual body cavity search to an inmates privacy interests, when carried
out reasonably, even absent probable cause, particularized suspicion, or
clear indication.6" A detention facility "is a unique place fraught with
serious security dangers." 62 The presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused was viewed as having "no application to a determination of
the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has
even begun." The presumption only "allocates the burden of proof in
criminal trials."6 3
C.

The Mixed Applications of the Schmerber Test and the Wolfish
Test to Visual Body Cavity Searches Incident to Arrest

The Supreme Court ruled in Chimel v. California that a police
officer may lawfully search an individual incident to lawful arrest to
55. See id.
56. See id. at n.39.
57. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
58. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 1978).
59. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).

60. See id.
61. Id. at 560.
62. Id. at 559.

63. Id. at 533.
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discover the fruits or evidence of a crime. 64 Later, in United States v.
Robinson,65 the Supreme Court stated that a "full body search" was reasonable as a search incident to arrest. 66 Lower courts thereafter permitted strip and body cavity searches incident to arrest under that premise,
even for misdemeanor offenses.
The Supreme Court commented in a later case that Robinson did
not discuss strip or body cavity searches.67 Several circuit courts have

since recognized that Robinson "simply did not contemplate the significantly greater intrusions that occur" in visual body cavity inspections.68
For this reason, the First Circuit in Swain v. Spinney6 9 decided the

visual body cavity search of an arrestee incident to arrest could not be
appropriately analyzed under Robinson and required independent analysis under the Wolfish test.7" In Swain, a woman was subjected to a strip
search and visual body cavity search, while being held in a cell at the
local police station. The court balanced the "dehumanizing, undignified,
humiliating, terrifying" search against legitimate law enforcement needs

such as institutional security7 1 and the need to discover evidence.72 The

Court determined that to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
"strip and visual body cavity searches must be justified by at least reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing contraband or weapons." 73 The court rejected the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Fuller v. M.G.
Jewelry,7 4 that absent jail security concerns, probable cause to search is
required and the Schmerber test applies.75
In Fuller,the Ninth Circuit did not disregard the Wolfish test. After
reaching the same conclusion as the First Circuit with regards to the
limitations of Robinson, the court discussed the reasonableness of the
search in Wolfish according to the specific facts of that case. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that it was because of the overwhelming interest "to
protect prisons and jails from smuggled weapons, drugs or other contraband which poses a threat to the safety and security of penal institu64. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
65. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).

66. See id. at 235.
67. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
68. See, e.g., Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Mary Beth G. v.
City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1271 (7th Cir. 1983).

69. 117 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
70. Id. at 3.
71. See id. at 6.
72. Justice v. Peachtree, 961 F.2d 188, 193 (11th Cir. 1992). But see Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry,

950 F.2d 1437, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that visual body cavity search as a search for
evidence, without penalogical security interest, must be justified by probable cause).
73. Swain, 117 F.3d at 5.
74. 950 F.2d 1437, 1449-50 (9th Cir. 1991).
75. See Swain, 117 F.3d at 7.
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that the searches were acceptable with less than probable cause.

The court also examined the decisions in other circuits to confirm
that strip and body cavity searches must be justified by institutional
security needs to be valid with less than probable cause.77 In Fuller, the
objective of the search was to discover ordinary stolen property (a miss-

ing ring), not a Weapon or "dangerous" contraband.7 8 The Fullers were

searched while detained at a stationhouse where they would not be
mixed with a general jail population.79 The court declined to extend the
reasonable suspicion standard to "searches for ordinary stolen
property. 8 °
In the absence of Wolfish's institutional security interests, the Ninth
Circuit held the search in question to be more like the search incident to
arrest in Schmerber.81 The court recognized "the interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such
intrusions on the mere chance that the desired evidence might be
obtained." 82 "Schmerber governs all searches that invade the interior of
the body-whether by a needle that punctures the skin or a visual intrusion into a body cavity."83 The invasion of dignity and privacy incurred
by even visual body cavity searches was deemed to be "at least" as great
8
as those from a blood test. "
The Missouri Court of Appeals in DaVee v. Mathis85 also addressed
the applicability of Schmerber to visual body cavity searches, but it
reached opposite result. In DaVee, the search was conducted pursuant to
a search warrant, but the reasonableness of execution was in question.86
The court believed that the citation to Schmerber by Justice Rehnquist in
Wolfish created a link between the reasonableness of a search and the
medical qualifications of the person conducting the search.87 The Court
76. Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1447.

77. See id. (citing to Watt v. Richardson Police Dept., 849 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1988)
(concluding that it was reasonable for police to strip search arrestees where their offenses "posed
the very threat of violence by weapons or contraband drugs that they must curtail in prisons");
Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1986); Mary Beth G. v. Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1271
(7th Cir. 1983); Holton v. Mohon, 684 F. Supp. 1407, 1415 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (holding that
purpose of strip and body cavity search is to look for weapons or contraband to protect inmates as
well as jail personnel)).

78. See Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1449.
79. See id. at 1448.
80. Id.

81. See id.
82. Id. at 1448-49.
83. Id. at 1449.

84. See id.
85. 812 S.W.2d 816 (Mo. App. 1991).

86. See id. at 824.
87. Id.
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quoted this passage of the Schmerber opinion:
[T]he record shows the test was performed in a reasonable manner.
Petitioner's blood was taken by a physician in a hospital environment
according to accepted medical practices. We are thus not presented
with the serious question which would arise if a search involving use
of a medical technique, even the most rudimentary sort, were made
by other than medical personnel or in other than a medical environment-for example, if it were administered by police in the privacy
of the station house.8 8
The DaVee court interpreted Schmerber to mean that "some body
cavity searches rise to the level of rudimentary medical techniques and
are, thus, unreasonable if conducted by nonmedical personnel."8 9 After
considering the decisions of other courts regarding the constitutionality
of body cavity searches, the Missouri Court of Appeals determined that
"body cavity searches involving only the visual examination of an individual's body cavities ... are not the type of rudimentary medical technique discussed in Schmerber and nonmedical personnel may conduct
visual body cavity searches without violating any Fourth amendment
rights." 90 The court considered this type of search "essentially a thorough strip search." 9 1
The DaVee court partially relied on United States ex rel. Guy v.
McCauley,9 2 but erred in its understanding of the facts of the case. The
Guy court stated that a visual body cavity search by police officers violated due process because, "[w]hile the probing and regarding of body
cavities and sexual organs is a routine medical practice, it is not normal
for it to be forced on individuals by nonmedical police personnel in nonmedical surroundings." 93
The intrusion into or examination of either vaginal or anal cavities
must be made by skilled medical technicians for at least two reasons.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 825-26.
91. Id. The court considered three decisions. First, Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366,
391-92 (9th Cir. 1968), which the Missouri Court of Appeals read as suggesting that removal of a
foreign object (such as a bag of heroin) from a body cavity violates constitutional rights unless
preformed by medical personnel. Second, United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp.
193, 199 (E.D. Wis. 1974), which followed a due process analysis to determine that a physical
vaginal cavity search violated due process when carried out by a police officer rather than a doctor
or nurse. Third, United States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296, 300-01 (1st Cir. 1975), which determined
that a body cavity search without piercing, probing or forced entry beyond the body's surface did
not fall under the heightened standard set by Schmerber.
92. 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
93. Id. at 199 (emphasis added). The court relied on the holding in Rochin v. California,342
U.S. 165 (1952), where the Court determined that the forced stomach pumping of an arrestee was
a Fifth amendment violation.
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The first is that the examination be caried out under sanitary conditions so that the dangers of physical harm to the individual be
reduced. Second, the magnitude of the intrusion to the individual's
integrity and dignity becomes greater if the search is perpetrated by a
94
police officer rather than a doctor or nurse.

Guy actually supports the view that visual body cavity searches are
a rudimentary medical procedure and thus still classifiable under
Schmerber.
IV.

RECONCILING THE SCHMERBER TEST AND THE WoLFIsH TEST

Both Swain and Fuller concerned searches incident to arrest.95 Both
courts determined that visual body cavity searches exceed those normally permitted under the search incident to arrest doctrine. 96 The
defendants in both cases were determined to have less weighty institutional security concerns than those in Wolfish. One court, however, recognized Schmerber as the controlling case, and the other court
recognized Wolfish.
A.

Reconciling Schmerber and Wolfish to ProvidedMore Stringent
Fourth Amendment Protection

The category of the intrusion in Schmerber was the blood test, and
the plaintiff's status was incident to arrest. The intrusion in Wolfish was
a visual body cavity search, and the status of the plaintiffs was that of
pre-trial detainees in a mixed-use facility. In order to harmonize these
two landmark cases and hypothesize as to the appropriate test for visual
body cavity searches incident to arrest, it must first be recognized that
nowhere in Wolfish does the court state or discuss whether a visual body
cavity search is an intrusion beneath the body's surface. Schmerber was
cited by the Wolfish court only to support the necessity of the search
being carried out in a reasonable manner.9 7 Additionally, nowhere in
Schmerber does the Supreme Court clarify what constitutes a bodily
intrusion. It is an insufficient analysis to assume that if Schmerber tests
intrusions below the body's surface, and the court declined to use this in
Wolfish, then a visual body cavity search is not considered such an intrusion. It is just as insufficient to assume that if a visual body cavity search
is an intrusion below the body's surface, then Wolfish impliedly limits
Schmerber to blood test cases or other physically intrusive medical practices. Can the two cases be reconciled to provide the public with greater
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. See supra at Part III.C.

96. See id.
97. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979).
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Fourth Amendment protection? Yes, by examining how the two tests
have spilled over into related areas.
The courts have addressed the issue of intrusions beyond the body's
surface such as blood tests, DNA sampling, and HIV tests in the prison
context, and they found that probable cause is required where the
searches are for the discovery of evidence.98 Where there is a distinct
and significant state interest, such as control of the AIDS epidemic99 and
the genetic fingerprinting of convicted sex offenders, 1°0 the search acts
are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without probable cause.
The reasonableness of these searches seems to not only rely on the
state's interest, but also on the low expectation of privacy retained by
convicted prisoners. As discussed previously, the state also has significant interest in maintaining prison security and safety. Therefore, a visual body cavity search, framed as an intrusion beyond the body's
surface, performed without probable cause upon a pre-trial detainee in a
joint housing facility, could be consistent with Wolfish. Despite the
detainee's now greater Fourth Amendment protection, the pre-trial
detainee's privacy interests would still be outweighed by the state's
interest in guarding against the real and immediate danger presented by
smuggled weapons, drugs, or contraband, just as detainee interests were
outweighed by the state's interests in the HIV testing and DNA sampling cases.
Consider also that while Justice Brennan dismissed the recognized
search incident to arrest considerations in Schmerber as having "little
applicability to intrusion beyond the body's surface," 10 ' he did include
in his opinion that "the attempt to secure evidence of blood alcohol con10 2
tent in this case was an appropriate incident to the petitioner'sarrest."
This suggests that the Court recognized a person's reduced expectation
of privacy in the incident to arrest status, but it found in Schmerber that
it was not so low that a warrantless blood test would be permitted without probable cause to search, a clear indication that evidence will be
found, and exigent circumstances. The pattern suggests that just as the
warrant requirement to search a person diminishes when a suspect is
98. See State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993).
99. See People v. Adams, 597 N.E. 2d 574 (Ill. 1992) (requiring incarcerated persons
convicted of prostitution, sex crimes or drug use involving hypodermic needles to submit to
involuntary HIV tests was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment because of state's interest
in preserving public health).
100. See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring felons convicted of murder or
specific sexual offenses to submit blood sample for a DNA databank was deemed constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment because of the public's interest in preventing recidivism and in
accurately identifying and prosecuting murderers and sex offenders).
101. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769 (1966).
102. Id. at 771.
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shifted from pre-arrest to search incident to arrest status, a similar diminishment can occur to the Schmerber probable cause and clear indication
requirement when a suspect shifts from incident to arrest to pre-trial
detainee status.
Because visual body cavity searches can be categorized as intrusions beneath the body's surface without conflicting with Wolfish, how
do such searches fare under the Schmerber test? The answer depends on
whether a visual body cavity search is a minor intrusion, equal to, or
greater than a blood test. Courts have described blood tests as being
more than an ordinary search, as requiring special treatment, and as a
violation of bodily integrity. 103 Nevertheless, blood tests have not been
described nearly as colorfully or with such a sense of horror as the visual
body cavity search. If a minor, medically common, non-traumatic procedure, such as drawing blood, requires probable cause and a clear indication, then certainly a "de-humanizing" process, such as these visual body
cavity inspections, deserves the same protection.
An important question remains: why should visual body cavity
searches be in the bodily intrusion category in the first place? They
cannot be placed in a more regulated category simply because they are
distasteful or offensive.
B.

Why Visual Body Cavity Searches Should be Considered

Intrusions Beyond the Body's Surface
The Court in Schmerber never mentions that its holding is limited
to physical intrusions. In fact, physicality is not mentioned at all.
Rather, the Court refers to "intrusions beyond the body's surface"' 4 that
jeopardize "interests in human dignity and privacy."' 0 5 The Court often
uses the term "intrusion" to discuss Fourth Amendment issues and has
not limited its use to the description of only physical penetrations.
In Katz v. United States,1" the Supreme Court stated, "[O]nce it is
recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply
'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear
that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.""1 7 The Katz
Court decided whether the wire tapping of a phone booth (where there
was no physical penetration of the area around the suspect) was an
unconstitutional search and seizure.
103. See supra Part III.A.
104. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769.

105. Id. at 769-770.
106. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

107. Id. at 353.
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The Court, in analyzing the case, explained:
that a duly authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for
such investigation, specifically informed of the basis on which it was
to proceed, and clearly appraised of the precise intrusion it would
entail, could constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the .Government
asserts in fact took place."' 8

Does Schmerber protect minor physical invasions of the body over
extreme visual invasions of the body, despite the possible emotional
consequences? The Court did not express its concern over blood tests
because breaking the skin is in and of itself detestable. It was thZ concern for "human dignity and privacy" that such 1°9
an intrusion would
threaten if its use was without stringent restriction.
The possible lasting effects of visual body cavity searches are
"shock, panic, depression, shame, rage, humiliation, and nightmares." ' 110
The psychological effects on some people reportedly resemble those of
rape victims. 11 The persons searched are required to humiliate themselves by stripping off all their clothes and then must reveal their most
private parts to complete, intimidating, and threatening strangers.
If a minor intrusion, such as a blood test, I 2 which results in "virtually no risk, trauma, or pain," ' 1 3 must meet a high Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard, then visual body cavity searches should meet
the same standard. This is particularly so when visual body cavity
searches can fall under the established category of "intrusions beyond
the body's surface" without a significant expansion in the meaning of
the phrase.
C.

Law Enforcement Ramifications

The dual purposes of searches incident to arrest are to search for
weapons and to discover the fruits of the crime that may be concealed or
destroyed. 1 4 If the probable cause/clear indication standard is set for
visual body cavity searches, will it jeopardize the safety of police officer
and result in lost evidence?
Two states, New Jersey and Tennessee, have passed statutes requiring a search warrant or consent in order to perform a visual body cavity
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 354.
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1275 (7th Cir. 1983).
See Paul R. Shuldiner, Visual Rape: A Look at the Dubious Legality of Strip Searches, 13
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 273, 296 (citing Simon, Strip Searches, 6 BARIUSTER 10 (1979)).
112. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
113. Id. at 770.
114. See supra Part II.
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search. The New Jersey statute defines a body cavity search as "the
visual or manual search of a person's anal or vaginal cavity.""' 5 The
search must be authorized by warrant or consent unless the person is
lawfully confined to an adult county correctional facility and the search
is based on reasonable suspicion.' 6 This statute was enacted in 1991.
A Tennessee statute defines a body cavity search as "an inspection,
probing or examination of the inside of a person's anus, vagina, or genitals."'1 7 A warrant for a body cavity search is likewise required by Tennessee.118 Tennessee's statute was enacted in 1993.
The heightened requirement of search warrants, implying at least a
probable cause requirement, has been tested by these two states for over
six years. There are no apparent movements pushing for a reversion to
prior standards. If this is accurate, it is a testament that safety and functionality can continue to be preserved under a probable cause standard.
The barring of visual body cavity searches incident to arrest does not
appear to be an impediment to police officers safely and effectively carrying out their duties)' 9 However, a more thorough and scientific testing
would be necessary to support this view definitively.
V.

THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY OBSTACLE

It is widely accepted that because of the distinct and overwhelming
interest in preserving prison security, a custodial search prior to admittance to a municipal detention center is permitted.12 0 For example, in
Jersey City, New Jersey, arrestees are first taken to the precinct house
for preliminary procedures.' 2' They are then sent to another facility for
prints and processing.12 2 Finally, arrestees are brought to the central
booking facility.' 23 Prior to arrival at the central booking facility, only
pat downs are carried out on arrestees.124 Articulable suspicion and
supervisory approval are required before more intrusive searches can be
performed.' 25 The Jersey City booking center is a mixed-use facility, so
both pre-trial detainees and incarcerated convicts are held there. Upon
115. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:161A-3 (West 1998).
116. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 161A-2 (West 1998).
117. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-7-121(a) (1998).
118. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-7-121(b) (1998).
119. Telephone Interview with Lt. Louf, Jersey City Police Dept, in Jersey City, N.J. (January
12, 1999).
120. See supra Part III.B. (The Wolfish Test).
121. See Telephone Interview with Lt. Louf, Jersey City Police Dept, in Jersey City, N.J. (Jan.
12, 1999).
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
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arrival, mandatory strip and visual body cavity searches are made and
physical body cavity searches can be carried out if reasonable suspicion
exists. 126 Such procedures are an expected result where only minor

search intrusions can be made outside of penal facilities.
Many courts and state legislatures have prohibited blanket strip/vis-

ual body cavity searches for misdemeanor arrestees, unless there is individualized suspicion. 127 The catalyst for this movement was Mary Beth
12
G. v. City of Chicago. 1

In Mary Beth G., Chicago had a blanket policy of performing visual
body cavity searches on female misdemeanor and traffic offenders who
were not inherently dangerous and who were being detained briefly

while awaiting bond.1 29 The official City policy was to:
1) lift her blouse or sweater and to unhook and lift her brassiere to
allow a visual inspection of the breast area, to replace these articles of
clothing and then
2) to pull up her skirt or dress or to lower her pants and pull down
any undergarments, to squat two or three times facing the detention
aide and to bend over at the waist to permit visual inspection of the
vaginal and anal area.130

The Seventh Circuit found that unlike the detainees in Wolfish, the
women in Mary Beth G. were minor offenders, and not inherently dangerous. On the other hand, the detainees in Wolfish were awaiting trial
on serious federal charges after having failed to make bond and were
being searched after contact visits. 1 3 I The court applied the Wolfish test
and determined that although detention centers may be "fraught with
126. See id.
127. See FLA. STAT. § 901.211 (WEST 1991):
(2) No person arrested for a traffic, regulatory, or misdemeanor offense, except in a
case which is violent in nature, which involves a weapon, or which involves a
controlled substance, shall be strip searched unless:
(a) There is probable cause to believe that the individual is concealing a
weapon, a controlled substance, or stolen property; or
(b) A judge at first appearance has found that the person arrested cannot be
released either on recognizance or bond and therefore shall be incarcerated in the
county jail.
See also Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1253 (6th Cir. 1989); Watt v. Richardson Police
Dep't, 849 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1988); Walsh v. Franco, 849 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 1988); Ward
v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739,
742 (8th Cir. 1985); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984); Mary Beth G. v. City of
Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir.
1981).
128. 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
129. Id. at 1267-68.
130. Id. at 1267.
131. See supra Part IUl.B.
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serious security dangers,"' 3 2 there was insufficient evidence that "those
dangers are created by female minor offenders entering the lockups for
short periods while awaiting bail."' 3 3 The need for strip or visual body
cavity searches, in the absence of evidence regarding incidences of
weapons and contraband found in the body cavities of misdemeanor
offenders, did not outweigh the "severity of the governmental
intrusion. "134
In contrast, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit, 3 no court or
legislature has provided the same protection for felony arrestees. Blanket
strip/visual body cavity of felony arrestees are permitted. One sentiment
on this matter was put forth by the United States District Court of Maryland which asserted, "[R]easonable suspicion exists to strip search all
felony arrestees ...,136 How true is this? Is there evidence to suggest
that all felony arrestees are likely to be secreting contraband or weapons
in a body cavity? Rather than linking blanket policies to specific types
of felonies, such as those involving weapons, violence, or narcotics, the
policy of searching the body cavities of felony arrestees, without regard
for the crime alleged, has been permitted without dispute.
The danger presented by failing to provide the same protection to
felony detainees as provided to misdemeanor detainees is that the suspected felon's right to suppress illegally obtained evidence, established
132. Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The Ninth Circuit, in Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 901 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1989),
reviewed a blanket policy requiring visual body cavity searches of all felony arrestees regardless
of reasonable suspicion. Ms. Kennedy held her roommate's property as security until her debts
were paid. Id. She was arrested for grand theft, a felony, and brought to the Van Nuys jail. Id.
There, she was forced to remove all her clothing, and, after a basic strip search, she "was required
to insert her fingers into her vagina and anus so that the policewomen could check whether she
had concealed any drugs or contraband in these body cavities." Id. at 711.
The court recognized the legitimate security interest in preventing drugs, contraband,
weapons, or other unlawful objects from entering penal facilities, but a search as intrusive as a
visual body cavity inspection must not rest on "societal judgements" or felony/misdemeanor
classifications. Id. at 717. Rather, there must be reasonable suspicion that the individual is
concealing contraband. "Reasonable suspicion may be based upon the nature of the offense, the
arrestee's appearance and conduct, and the prior arrest record." Id. at 716 (citing Giles v.
Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1984)).
136. Smith v. Montgomery County, Maryland, 643 F. Supp. 435, 439 (D. Md. 1986) (holding
that blanket strip and visual body cavity search policy covering all temporary detainees at the
county detention center did not violate the Fourth Amendment with regards to felony arrestees and
those misdemeanor offenders for whom there was individualized reasonable suspicion that they
were concealing weapons or contraband); see Davis v. Camden, 657 F. Supp. 396, 400-401 (D.
N.J. 1987) (holding blanket policy requiring strip searches for all arrestees regardless of the nature
of the charged offense or individualized suspicion invalid, but a blanket policy which only
requires such a search for felony offenders and misdemeanors involving weapons or contraband is
based on a reasonable justification that such arrestees will likely conceal weapons or contraband).
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by Mapp v. Ohio,'37 will be trumped automatically by the inevitable
discovery exception in strip and visual body cavity search cases. 138 The
suppression of ill-gotten evidence is a prophylactic doctrine to help prevent abuses by law enforcement officers.1 39 This safeguard may be rendered impotent when improper physical searches of felony suspects, for
whom there is probable cause to arrest, are made outside of the stationhouse or detention center.
This strategy worked for the defendants in Louisiana v. Bullock. 4 °
There, police officers properly executed a warrant to search the residence of suspected cocaine dealer, Willie Cole.'4 1 Upon entering, the
police found Dawn Bullock (the defendant) and Cole lying on a bed in
the bedroom. Another woman, one of four present in the house, was
found attempting to flush down the toilet a plastic bag, later found to
contain cocaine. In the bedroom, a handgun was found.' 42 Because
both Cole and Bullock had prior felony convictions, they were both
arrested for being convicted felons in possession of a handgun.' 43 A
female DEA agent then took Bullock into a bathroom in the house, conducted a strip search, and found the end of a plastic bag protruding from
her vagina."' The agent pulled out the bag and, as a result of a physical
body cavity search, discovered another bag of what was later determined
45
to be cocaine.'
The court agreed with the defendants that the search of Bullock
exceeded the scope of the warrant that it also exceeded the scope of a
search incident to arrest allowed by both Chimel and State v. Wilson.'4 6
It likewise found that with respect to the manual cavity search, the
Schmerber test was applicable to determine the search's permissibility
absent a warrant. 14 7 The search failed this test due to a lack of emergency. However, because there was already probable cause to arrest for
possession of the firearm, and Bullock would have been reasonably
searched at Central Lockup, the evidence would have inevitably been
discovered and therefore, suppression was not required. 148
137. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
138. See generally Steven P. Grossman, The Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery: A Plea for
Reasonable Limitations, 92 DICK. L. REV. 313 (1988).
139. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657-60; see also, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (adopting
the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule).

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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So. 2d 1074 (La. App. 1995).
id. at 1075.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 1076.
id. at 1077.
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A similar, but unsuccessful attempt, to suppress evidence was made
by the defendants in Commonwealth v. DiCicco.149 There, police

officers had a warrant to search the person and automobile of
DiCicco. 150 The warrant was based on the affidavit of a confidential
informant who alleged that DiCicco sold heroin and generally stored it
in his anus.' 5 The police pulled DiCicco over in a well-lit, residential
area with heavy vehicular and pedestrian traffic.152 While standing on
the sidewalk, after initial questioning and a pat-down search, DiCicco
was told to drop his pants and underwear to the ground.1 53 The officer
inspected and briefly touched DiCicco's genitals.1 54 Finding nothing, the
officer next instructed DiCicco to turn around and bend over whereupon
a small bag fell from between his buttocks.1 55 Subsequent tests later
revealed the contents to be heroin. The court held the search to be
56
unreasonable. 1
The court found the scope and manner of the search severe and
highly intrusive. A search such as this, in a public place, was constitutionally invalid.' 5 7 The Commonwealth argued in vain that DiCicco was
shielded from public view by the seven police officers present, parked
cars, overhanging trees, and a police dog.158
The Commonwealth also claimed that "because the Commonwealth
could have lawfully obtained an arrest warrant for DiCicco and conducted a search of his person pursuant to that arrest, which search [sic]
would have inevitably led to their discovery of the bag."' 159 The court

rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the Commonwealth did
not present sufficient evidence that an arrest warrant would have been
1 60
sought absent the discovery of the illegally discovered bag of heroin.
Second, the court considered the constitutional violation in this case "to
be so severe, the inevitable
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule,
' 161
should not apply."
This case again presents the problem of how to measure degrees of
149. No. 931871001, 1994 WL 879762, at *1 (Mass. Super. May 24,1994).
150. See id.

151. See id.
152. See id. at *2.
153. See id.

154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at *3.
157. See id.

158. See id.
159. Id. at *4.
160. See id.
161. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 546 N.E. 2d 336 (Mass. 1989) ("We think the
severity of the constitutional violation is critical in deciding whether to admit evidence that it is
shown would inevitably have been discovered.").
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intrusion where the searches themselves are difficult to quantify. Logically, as the intrusiveness of the search escalates, so should the safeguards against them. Likewise, as the expectation of privacy associated
with a person's status declines, fewer impediments to police and correctional measures remain. A court would be likely to find a warrantless
manual body cavity search of an arrestee in public so unreasonable and
such an extreme intrusion that the inevitable discovery exception would
not be permitted. The line blurs considerably from there.
Not only is it difficult to determine a hierarchy of intrusiveness
based upon the suspect's status minus the scope or category of the
search, but additional factors, such as the manner in which the search
which it was carried out and the location of the suspect at the time of the
search, complicate this calculus further. This makes it exceedingly difficult for there to be consistency in court decisions. For example, one
might assume that a visual body cavity search or strip search in public
view would violate all concepts of decency. Such was the holding in
State v. Walker.162 However, what is deemed to be "in the public view"
is subjective. In State v. Casterlow-Bey, a strip search in a mall parking
lot, using a police car door as a privacy screen, was considered "a relatively private setting given the circumstances" and therefore a reasonable search. 163 The inevitable discovery doctrine should not be a blanket
and should not be used in all circumstances." This is especially so
when its application may encourage law-enforcement shortcuts whenever evidence may be more readily obtained by unlawful means. If this
doctrine must apply, then the adoption of a good faith requirement, as
suggested by Professor Wayne La Fave, is the minimum the courts can
do to provide protections from the abusive use of visual body cavity
searches. 165
VI.

CONCLUSION

The practice of performing warrantless visual body cavity searches
with less than probable cause to search and a clear indication that evidence will be found is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
Visual body cavity searches should satisfy the technical aspects and the
162. No. 97APA09-1219, 1998 WL 429121 (Ohio App. July 28, 1998) (holding that where a
police officer pulled down suspect's pants, saw a bag between the suspect's buttocks, and
retrieved the bag, the search was unreasonable because the act took place in public behind a van);

see also Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 498 S.E.2d 464 (Va. 1998).
163. State v. Casterlow-Bey, No. 21338-9-11, 1998 WL 97083, at *6 (Wash. App. March 06,
1998) (unpublished opinion).
164. See State v. Ault, 72 P.2d 545 (Ariz. 1986) (holding the inevitable discovery exception
does not apply to unconstitutional searches or seizures in the home).
165. See WAYNE LA FAvE, 4 W. LA FAVE, § 11.4(a), p. 383 (2d ed. 1987)
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spirit of the Schmerber v. California decision. The Supreme Court set
out to protect human dignity and privacy, and it did not seek to turn its
back on this principle in Bell v. Wolfish. Wolfish represents the difficult
choices the Court is often forced to make when weighing two vital interests: the privacy interests of pre-trial detainees versus the security interests of prison personnel and inmates. The Supreme Court's prioritization
of institutional security over individual privacy in Wolfish should not
affect Fourth Amendment protection outside of the prison or detention
center context.
Even more disturbing than visual body cavity searches incident to
arrest on less than probable cause is the possibility of the Fourth Amendment losing more of its teeth. If courts allow the detention center preadmission search to be grounds for inevitable discovery, then there will
be little protection against bad faith abuses and intrusions to privacy.
Such a loss of constitutional rights is unacceptable.
The courts must read and apply their own words-"demeaning,"
"dehumanizing," "degrading," and "repulsive." That is how they view
the visual body cavity search. The courts need only to hold that the
dignity and privacy of one's body are vital human interests. The courts
must find that, although permitted in jail on mere reasonable suspicion,
authorities must meet the Schmerber standard in order to conduct visual
body cavity searches incident to arrest. That is, they must establish that
they have probable cause to search and clear indication that the evidence
sought will be found.
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